Introduction
Civilian, military, and commercial
pilots have reported seeing unidentified aerial
phenomena (UAP) for over fifty years. These
ubiguitous phenomena have been reported by air crews
of almost every nation on earth and have led, in the
past, to the establishment of several official
civilian or military review boards or study groups
(e.g., Chile, France, Soviet Union, United States of
America). The interested reader should consult
(Haines, 1983, 1992, 1993, 1994, 2000; Hall, 1964;
Jacobs, 1975, Gillmor, 1968; Ruppelt, 1956) for
examples of such accounts.
As interesting as these general pilot
sighting reports are there is another type of aviation
event that is even more interesting and of more
potential importance to those who are technically and
scientifically minded, viz., UAP-related
electro-magnetic effects on board the aircraft that
could have impacted flight safety. The primary purpose
of this paper is to review over fifty years of pilot
reports which both authors have compiled over the
years. These cases involve one or more on-board
systems (navigation, guidance and control equipment,
cockpit displays, circuit breakers, other
electro-magnetically controlled systems) were
influenced allegedly when one or more UAP were
physically near the aircraft. Clearly, it is both the
physical proximity of the UAP as well as the transient
nature of these E-M effects that make them so
interesting. If it can be shown that there is a
direct, range-related influence of UAP on cockpit (and
other) on-board systems then the application of
traditional laws of physics is appropriate. And, if
these effects last only as long as the UAP is near the
aircraft and return to normal function after the UAP
departs, it suggests that they are caused directly by
the UAP and are not random or unrelated energy
interactions within the airborne system(s). The
following section discusses how these cases were
selected for study?
-
Electro-Magnetic Case Acceptance Rating Methodology
(EMCARM) -
This methodology provides a set of rating criteria
for pilot reports involving EM effects. EMCARM
represents a clear and relatively simple set of
acceptance guidelines with which to accept or reject
candidate EM reports. Table 1 presents the eleven
factors and their ratings.
Table 1
EMCARM Evaluation Factors
| Number |
Factor |
Criterion |
Rating |
| 1. |
Pilot Flying Experience |
> 5000 hrs. (commercial or military)
|
4 |
| |
|
1 to 5000 hrs. (commercial / military)
|
3 |
| |
|
> 1000 hrs. (private)
|
2 |
| |
|
1 – 1000 hrs (private)
|
1 |
| |
|
Not mentioned
|
0 |
| 2. |
Number of Aircrew Witnesses |
>3 |
3 |
| |
|
2 pilots (or 2 rated aircrew) |
2 |
| |
|
1 pilot/aircrew
|
1 |
| |
|
Not mentioned
|
0 |
| 3. |
Aircraft and UAP Altitude Scoring Matrix
(use number in appropriate cell) |
|
|
|
|
50 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
2 |
|
Aircraft Altitude
|
30 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
2 |
0 |
|
|
(ft x
1000) |
10 |
1 |
4 |
3 |
1 |
0 |
|
|
|
1 |
3 |
2 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
|
|
|
|
1 |
10 |
30 |
50 |
70 |
|
|
|
|
UAP
Altitude (ft. x 1000) |
| Number |
Factor |
Criterion |
Rating |
| 4. |
Separation Distance (d)
between Aircraft and UAP |
Very near (within 30 feet) |
4 |
| |
|
Moderately near (30<d<100 feet) |
3 |
| |
|
Moderately distant (100<d<5000 ft) |
2 |
| |
|
Very distant (> 5000 feet) |
1 |
| |
|
Can’t be determined/not mentioned |
0 |
| 5. |
Ambient illumination |
Full daylight |
3 |
| |
|
Very dim ( incl. dawn or dusk) |
2 |
| |
|
Dark |
1 |
| |
|
Not mentioned |
0 |
| 6. |
Duration of EM Effect(s) |
Only during closest approach and
ceased after UAP departed |
4 |
| |
|
Appeared when UAP arrived and did
not return to normal after UAP departed |
2 |
| 7. |
Severity of EM Effect(s) |
More than 3 independent
sub-systems affected |
4 |
| |
|
1 sub-system affected |
3 |
| |
|
1 or more sub-systems had to be
replaced |
3 |
| |
|
Not specified |
0 |
| 8. |
Sighting Duration (t) |
>90 minutes |
5 |
| |
|
10<t<60 minutes |
4 |
| |
|
2<t<10 minutes |
3 |
| |
|
0.5<t<2 minutes |
2 |
| |
|
<0.5 minutes |
1 |
| |
|
Not specified |
0 |
| 9. |
Aircraft Ground Speed (v) |
> Mach 1.0 |
3 |
| |
(Note: UAP must be near and
maintaining station with aircraft to validly apply
these ratings) |
250<v<600 mph (~Mach 1) |
2 |
| |
|
Stall<v<250 mph |
1 |
| |
|
If not specified (private single engine
aircraft=1; twin engine jet aircraft=2) |
1 or 2 |
| 10. |
UAP Ground Speed |
Ditto number 9, above |
|
| 11. |
UAP Maneuverability |
UAP circles aircraft that is flying
on constant heading |
3 |
| |
(Relative to aircraft) |
UAP maintains “station” precisely as
aircraft changes heading, altitude, etc. |
3 |
| |
(UAP must be nearby) |
UAP executes high precision flight, high-g turns,
hi accel. stops/starts
over relatively long periods of time
typ. > 5 min.) |
3 |
| |
|
other maneuvers
|
3 |
| |
|
Not specified |
0 |
| |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
|
MAXIMUM SCORE |
40 |
| |
|
|
|
In this report, a Category 1 incident
achieved an ENCARM score of 22 or more and was
included in the study while a Category 2 incident had
a score of less than 22 and was not included.
Category 3 incidents possessed scores between 20 and
21 and were reserved for possible future
investigation as more information became available.
The Category 1 threshold score is admittedly somewhat
arbitrary yet it does provide an approximate boundary
between the top 40%.
It should be understood that this type of report
rating methodology is most useful in evaluating a
large number of cases, each of which differs along
different lines of evidence.
Since no two cases are likely to be the same EMCARM
employs enough different factors and criteria to
bridge the broad array of case detail differences. Of
course, one practical difficulty in applying this
methodology is that many reports lack sufficient
detail to complete all eleven factors or to judge them
accurately. This calls for significantly more
rigorous data collection in the future.
E-M Effect Taxonomy
One of the authors (R.F.H.) developed a descriptive
aircraft systems taxonomy that was found to be useful
in his ongoing AirCatalogue (AIRCAT) research. This
taxonomy (cf. Appendix) provides a three level
designation system so that on-board systems can be
grouped according to common functions in
computer-based analyses. It was found to be useful in
the present study.
Consistent use of such a two-
or three-letter code will efficiently capture a large
majority of EM effects experienced on-board an
aircraft. Of course multiple codes should be used if
more than one system was affected. Aviation
specialists and mechanics can study these codes and
learn what they share in common (besides electrical
current and pulse frequency) and thereby possibly
understand what might have caused the system
effect(s).
Preliminary Results
The
following subjects are discussed in this section: (A)
Statistical Overview of Thirty Three (52%) of the
total
Sixty Four Cases Scoring 22 or Higher on the EMCARM
Rating Scale, (B) Study of E-M Effects – Experimental
Questions, (C). How E-M Effects Are Distributed by
Type of Aircraft, (D). Correlation Between Specific
E-M Effects and Distance to UAP, (E)
Relationship between E-M Effects and Reported UAP
Maneuverability, (F) Position of UAP relative to the
Aircraft and E-M Effects.
A. Statistical Overview of Thirty Three (52%) of
the
Total Sixty Four Cases Scoring 22 or
Higher on the EMCARM Rating Scale.
Fifty seven E-M cases were subjected to the EMCARM
"filter.” The results follow:
|
Scores |
Number of Cases |
|
Minimum score 9 |
1 |
|
Maximum score 31 |
2 |
|
Mean score 22 |
5 |
|
From 22 to 31 |
33 cases (category 1) |
|
From 9 to 21 |
31 cases
(category
2) |
EMCARM Criteria Selection Results for the 33 “Category
1” cases:
Factor 1: Pilot Flying Experience
| |
Number of Cases |
|
>500 hrs. (Commercial Rated Pilot – military
pilot) |
6 |
|
1-500 hrs (commercial pilot – military pilot) |
2 |
|
>1000 hrs (private pilot) |
5 |
|
1-1000 hrs (Private pilot) |
6 |
|
Not mentioned |
14 |
The "not mentioned" factor has the highest score (14).
High time commercial pilots also tend to see (or only
report?) more than do low time pilots.
Factor 2 : Number of Aircrew Witnesses
| |
Number of Cases |
|
>3 pilots / aircrew members |
10 |
|
2 pilots (or 2 rated crew members) |
12 |
|
1 pilot / aircrew member |
11 |
|
Not mentioned |
0 |
Factor 3 : Aircraft and UAP Altitude
|
altitude |
nb of a/c |
nb of UAP |
|
<1000 ft |
0 |
0 |
|
<10000 ft |
21 |
14 |
|
<30000 ft |
09 |
06 |
|
<50000 ft |
03 |
03 |
|
not specified |
0 |
10 |
__________________________________________________________
Factor 4 : Aircraft and UAP Separation Distance (d)
| |
Number of Cases |
|
Very near (within 30 ft)
|
3 |
|
Moderately near (30<d<100 ft)
|
2 |
|
Moderately distant (100<d<5000 ft) |
13 |
|
Very distant (>5000 ft) |
7 |
|
Not mentioned |
8 |
Separation distance between aircraft and UAP is
probably the single most important factor for E-M
cases. The above table shows that 18 cases occurred at
a distance of from 10 and 5,000 feet.
Factor 5 : Ambient illumination
| |
Number of Cases |
|
Full daylight |
14 |
|
Very dim (dawn or dusk)
|
0 |
|
Darkness
|
18 |
|
Not
mentioned |
1 |
Factor 6 : E-M Effect Duration
| |
Number of Cases |
|
Only during closest approach phase
(thereafter E-M symptoms disappeared) |
30 |
|
E-M symptoms
appeared with UAP
(and did not return to normal after UFO
departure) |
1 |
|
Not
mentioned |
2 |
The main results for this factor indicate that these
effects were transient in most of the cases - 30 of
the 33 (91%). In only one case did the E-M effects not
return to normal. This indicates that E-M symptoms
were very likely caused by the UAP.
Factor 7 : E-M Effect Severity
| |
Number of Cases |
|
More than 3 independent sub-systems affected |
2 |
|
1 sub-system affected |
31 |
|
1 or more sub-systems had to be replaced
|
0 |
|
Not specified |
0 |
Comments : In most of the 33 cases
only one or two sub-systems of the aircraft were
affected by E-M effects. But for case n°16
(24/03/1955), 9 different sub-systems were affected
(electrical system and power plant).
Factor 8 : Sighting Duration (t)
| |
Number of Cases |
|
>60 min. |
1 |
|
10<t<60 min. |
11 |
|
2<t<10 min. |
13 |
|
0.5<t<2 min. |
3 |
|
<0.5 min. |
3 |
|
Not specified |
2 |
Factor 9 : Aircraft Ground Speed (v)
| |
Number of Cases |
|
>Mach 1.0 |
2 |
|
250<v<600 mph (Mach.1) |
7 |
|
Stall<v<250 mph. |
23 |
|
Not specified |
1 |
During E-M effects, Aircraft ground speed was, for
most of the cases (23 among 33), between stall and 250
mph. More exactly, for 19 cases the aircraft speed was
between 100 and 250 mph. The minimum aircraft speed
was: 80 mph.
Factor
10 : UAP Ground Speed (v)
| |
Number of Cases |
|
>Mach 1.0 |
3 |
|
250<v<600 mph (Mach.1) |
7 |
|
Stall<v<250 mph. |
13 |
|
Not specified |
10 |
There are fewer cases where the speed of the UAP was
mentioned, but when it was (23 cases) the speed of the
UAP and the speed of the aircraft were the same in 19
cases (83%).
Factor 11 : UAP Maneuverability - Relative to
Aircraft (UAP must be nearby aircraft)
| UAP Maneuver |
Number of Cases |
|
UAP circles aircraft when aircraft flies straight
|
2 |
|
UAP flies “station” (paces) precisely as aircraft
changes heading, altitude, etc. |
16 |
|
UAP executes high precision flight, high-g turns,
high acceleration, stop/starts
for relatively long period of time
(e.g.,>5 minutes) |
8 |
|
Other maneuvers
|
7 |
| Not specified |
0 |
| |
|
| |
|
B. Study of E-M Effects – experimental questions
Distribution of E-M effects for the 33 "category 1"
cases, using Haines' Airplane E-M Effects Nomenclature
/ Taxonomy list:
A.
Distribution of E-M Effects symptoms for each cases
(including EMCARM aircraft/UAP separation distance
criteria 4)
|
Case
n° |
Date |
Location |
Type
of a/c* |
distance
a/c – UAP
(ft) |
EMCARM
factor 4
** |
No of
EM
effects |
EME Type
Level1 (Level2) |
EMCARM
total
score |
|
3 |
00/02/44 |
Australia |
M |
100 |
MD |
2 |
E(D)+E(R) |
27 |
|
8 |
24/07/49 |
USA |
P |
1500 |
MD |
1 |
P(P) |
23 |
|
11 |
10/02/51 |
Canada |
M |
100 |
MD |
2 |
E(D)+E(M) |
31 |
|
12 |
00/04/51 |
USA |
P |
|
0 |
3 |
E(M)+P(P)+M(O) |
24 |
|
13 |
18/09/51 |
Canada |
M |
170184 |
VD |
1 |
E(D)+R(A) |
26 |
|
15 |
02/02/55 |
Venezuela |
C |
1320 |
MD |
1 |
E(R) |
23 |
|
16 |
24/03/55 |
Japan |
P |
900 |
MD |
9 |
E(A)+E(B)+E(D)+E(E)+E(T)+
E(V)+P(P) |
27 |
|
18 |
16/01/57 |
USA |
M |
|
|
1 |
E(M) |
24 |
|
19 |
31/05/57 |
UK |
C |
|
0 |
1 |
E(R) |
23 |
|
23 |
13/08/59 |
USA |
P |
500 |
MD |
1 |
E(M) |
22 |
|
26 |
20/04/64 |
Antartic |
M |
|
0 |
3 |
E(R)+P(P)+R(A) |
24 |
|
28 |
03/02/67 |
Peru |
C |
48614 |
VD |
3 |
E(L)+E(M)+E(R) |
22 |
|
29 |
09/06/67 |
Spain |
M |
3937 |
MD |
1 |
E(R) |
25 |
|
63 |
18/06/68 |
Venezuela |
P |
330 |
MD |
1 |
E(R) |
24 |
|
31 |
22/08/68 |
Australia |
P |
|
|
1 |
E(R) |
23 |
|
32 |
24/10/68 |
USA |
M |
2000 |
MD |
3 |
E(R)+R(A) |
30 |
|
34 |
02/02/73 |
New Zealand |
C |
90 |
MN |
3 |
E(D)+E(M)+E(V) |
27 |
|
35 |
16/07/73 |
Spain |
P |
|
VD |
1 |
E(R) |
25 |
|
36 |
18/10/73 |
USA |
M |
500 |
MD |
2 |
E(M)+E(R) |
29 |
|
38 |
28/11/74 |
USA |
P |
1320 |
MD |
1 |
E(M) |
23 |
|
39 |
13/08/76 |
Germany |
P |
|
0 |
2 |
E(M)+M(O) |
23 |
|
40 |
19/09/76 |
Iran |
M |
15000 |
VD |
3 |
E(I)+E(N)+E(R)+R(A) |
23 |
|
41 |
12/03/77 |
USA |
C |
3000 |
MD |
3 |
A(H)+E(G)+E(M) |
29 |
|
42 |
17/06/77 |
Portugal |
M |
18 |
VN |
2 |
E(G)+M(O) |
28 |
|
43 |
26/10/77 |
USA |
M |
121560 |
VD |
1 |
E(R) |
22 |
|
44 |
18/11/77 |
USA |
P |
89760 |
VD |
1 |
E(T) |
24 |
|
45 |
26/05/79 |
USA |
P |
|
0 |
4 |
E(D)+E(M)+E(R)+P(P) |
22 |
|
46 |
10/09/79 |
USA |
P |
160 |
VN |
1 |
E(R) |
30 |
|
48 |
08/04/81 |
USA |
P |
500 |
MD |
3 |
E(E)+E(R)+E(T) |
25 |
|
49 |
18/06/82 |
China |
M |
|
0 |
2 |
E(G)+E(R) |
24 |
|
50 |
24/10/82 |
USA |
P |
10 |
VN |
1 |
E(A) |
25 |
|
51 |
23/09/84 |
Argentina |
P |
|
|
1 |
E(M) |
22 |
|
53 |
17/11/86 |
USA |
C |
500 |
MD |
1 |
E(R)) |
31 |
(*) M = military, P = private, C = commercial
(**)VN = very near, MN = moderately near, MD =
moderately distant, VD = very distant
B. Distribution of the E-M effects for Taxonomy Level
1and 2 cases
Level 1 No. of
Level 2 No.
of
Basic System Cases Specific
Hardware Affected Cases
____________________________________________________________________________
Autopilot 1 Heading
mode of operation 1
Electrical system 46
Altimeter
1
Automatic direction finder
5
Distance Measuring Equipment
1
Gyro-compass system
3
Inertial navigation system
1
Cabin
lights
1
Magnetic compass system, RMI,
&/or slaved gyro-compass
12
Military weapon
1
Radio system
18
Transponder system
2
VOR system
1
Power plant 4
Reciprocating engine
4
Radar 4
On-board
4
Air
visual contact simultaneously
2
Miscellaneous 3 Other
3
____________________________________________________________________________
Total 58 E-M effects
for 33 reports
Comments. Fifty eight different E-M
effects were discovered among these 33 cases. The
aircraft electrical system category had the most with
46 (79%), then power plant and on-board radar 4 (7%)
effects each with 3 more (5%) in the miscellaneous
category. In 32 cases there is at least one E-M effect
on the electrical system.
Concerning the distribution of the 46 E-M effects on
electrical system, the radio system(s) had 18 (39%)
effects and the magnetic compass system had 12 (26%)
effects.
Concerning the E-M effects upon on-board radar, only
cases involving E-M effects registered on air-borne
radar with at least one other E-M effect on another
system (electrical, power plant or autopilot) were
selected for inclusion in this report. These results
will change when an additional 58 on-board radar cases
will be added to this study. Autopilot function,
lights, and VOR system were affected in only three
cases, all commercial aircraft.
Altimeter, distance measuring equipment, and
transponder systems were affected in only four private
aircraft cases.
On-board
radar effects (in, correlation with other E-M effects)
occurred in only four military aircraft cases.
C. How E-M Effects are Distributed by Type of
Aircraft
The 33 "Category 1" cases are distributed as follows:
Military (M) = 12 cases, Commercial (C) = 6, Private
(P) = 15 cases. For all 64 E-M cases (category 1 +
category 2), the distribution is: M = 25, C = 15, P =
23. This may be compared with the distribution found
in 1,305 cases of a larger aircraft/UAP database
(D.F.W.) where the overall distribution of cases is: M
= 606, C = 444, P = 193, not mentioned = 43, multiple
aircraft types (C & M, C & P, or P & M) = 19. Private
aircraft clearly experience a disproportionately
larger percentage of reported EM effects than the
distribution of UAP reports in the larger database.
Most of the pilot reports in the larger database are
only of visual sightings.
Level 1
Level 2
Type of aircraft
(M/C/P)
__________________________________________________________________________________
Autopilot Heading
mode of operation
M=0 C=1 P=0
Electrical system
Altimeter
M=0 C=0 P=1
Automatic direction finder
M=3* C=1
P=2
Distance Measuring Equipment
M=0 C=0 P=1
Gyro-compass system
M=2 C=1 P=0
Inertial navigation system
M=1 C=0 P=0
Lights
M=0 C=1 P=0
Magnetic compass system, RMI,
&/or slaved gyro-compass
M=3**
C=3
P=6
Military weapon
M=1
C=0
P=0
Radio system
M=8
C=4
P=6
Transponder system
M=0
C=0
P=2
VOR system M=0 C=1 P=0
Power plant Reciprocating
engine
M=1 C=0 P=3
Radar
On-board
M=4 C=0 P=0
Air
visual contact simultaneously (not an
EME case)
Miscellaneous Other
M=1 C=0
P=2
Comments:
It is known that many types of military aircraft are
specially shielded against spurious and deliberate
external enemy E-M radiation. This fact deserves
further study in relation to reported E-M effects from
UAP on various aircraft types for it may shed light on
specific aspects of the radiation thought to originate
from UAP.
Among the 12 military cases, there were E-M effects on
the magnetic compass system, RMI, and/or slaved
gyro-compass system in only three cases. Furthermore,
for these two of these three cases the type of
aircraft is important, viz., one helicopter and a
transport airplane, (U.S. Navy R5D), which is the
military version of the commercial DC-4.
E-M effects on radio systems occurred most frequently
(16 cases; 39%).
Concerning the reported E-M effects on automatic
direction finding (ADF) hardware (six cases), tthree
are military cases, but they took place in the
early-years (1944 and 1951).
It appears that private aircraft are more prone to E-M
effects as mentioned above. Magnetic compasses (6
cases) and radios (6 cases) are the most affected
systems on private aircraft. E-M effects also occurred
on power plants (3 cases).
D. Correlation Between Specific E-M effects and
Distance to the UAP
The approximate distance between the airplane and UAP
is known in 23 cases of the 33 cases. The distribution
of aircraft type by distance for these 29 cases is:
Distance : No. of cases Type of
aircraft
______________________________________________________________________________
>10,000 ft 5 cases
M = 3 A = 1 P = 1
< 3,000 ft 17 cases
M = 6 A = 4 P = 7
< 2,000 ft 15 cases
M = 5 A = 3 P = 7
< 1,000 ft 11 cases
M
= 4 A = 2 P = 5
< 500 ft 10 cases
M
= 3 A = 2 P = 5
< 100 ft 5 cases
M = 3 A = 1 P = 1
< 50 ft 2 cases
M*= 1 A = 0 P = 1 (* the
military aircraft was a light plane)
unknown 7 cases
M = 2 A = 1 P = 4
_______________________________________________________________________________
Distance No. of cases Type of EME (See
Appendix)
_______________________________________________________________________________
>10,000 ft 5 cases E(D) E (L) E(M) E(R) E(I)
E(N) R(A) E (T)
< 3,000 ft 17 cases A(H) E(D) E(R) E
(M) E(A) E(B) E(E) E (G) E(T) E(V) R(A) P(P)
< 2,000 ft 15 cases E(D) E(R) E (M) E(A)
E(B) E(E) E (G) E(T) E(V) R(A) P(P)
< 1,000 ft 11 cases E(D) E(M) E(R) E(A)
E(B) E(E) E(G) E(T) E(V) P(P) M(O)
< 500 ft 10 cases E(A) E(D) E(M) E(R)
E(V) E(G) M(O)
< 100 ft 5 cases E(A) E(D) E(M) E(R)
E(V) E(G) M(O)
< 50 ft 2 cases E(A) E(G) M(O)
________________________________________________________________________________
Curiously, in the two cases in which the aircraft were
at the smallest distance (ten feet and 18 feet) from
the UAP there was only one E-M effect for each case:
the altimeter (at 10 feet) and electrically
driven directional gyroscope (at 18 feet). In
the first case (n°50), a UAP paced a Piper Cherokee at
an estimated 150 feet distance for 10 minutes with no
E-M effects, then suddenly it crossed the aircraft
flight path and passed about 10 feet from the right
wing tip. The altimeter malfunctioned as it passed. In
the second case (n°42), a Dornier 27 light plane began
to vibrate violently and went into an uncontrolled
dive while it was at no more than 18 feet from another
UAP. The directional gyroscope rotated wildly and
deviated by 180° relative to the magnetic compass.
E-M effects on automatic direction finders (ADF)
occurred at relatively short distances (between 90 and
100 ft) in 3 cases (n°3, 11, 34).
Effects on power plant occurred between 900 feet and
1,500 feet distance. At 900 feet, the single engine of
a Beechcraft sputtered and all the instruments stopped
working when a “hat-shaped” object flew around the
aircraft. At 1,500 feet distance a brand new 4
cylinder engine began to malfunction when the pilot
crossed the flight path of seven delta-shaped objects
(the four spark plugs were shorted and eventually
burned out.
Five E-M effects on electrical systems occurred only
in the four largest separation distance cases, between
an estimated 15,000 feet and 170,000 feet. The eight
electrical systems affected were: inertial navigation
system (I), lights (L), and military weapon (N). The
inertial navigation system and military weapons were
affected in only one case, viz., Tehran, 1976. Here, a
military F-4 Phantom jet aircraft, at a distance of
15,000 ft from the UAP, experienced INS fluctuations
from 30 to 50° during a 360° orbit by the pilot in
addition to failure of its Sidewinder missile firing
system.
E. Relationship between E-M Effects and reported UAP
maneuverability
|
Case
n° |
Date |
Location |
UAP maneuverability |
EME Type *
Level1 (Level2) |
|
3 |
00/02/44 |
USA |
pace |
E(D)+E(R) |
|
8 |
24/07/49 |
USA |
passed on the left, turn right ahead and passed on
the right |
P(P) |
|
11 |
10/02/51 |
Canada |
came toward, reversed its course and disappeared |
E(D)+E(M) |
|
12 |
00/04/51 |
USA |
stationary with oscillating motion |
E(M)+P(P)+M(O) |
|
13 |
18/09/51 |
Canada |
parallel |
E(D)+R(A) |
|
15 |
02/02/55 |
Venezuela |
came toward, leveled off and raced away |
E(R) |
|
16 |
24/03/55 |
Japan |
came to the left, flew around |
E(A)+E(B)+E(D)+E(E)+
E(T)+E(V)+P(P) |
|
18 |
16/01/57 |
USA |
paced the aircraft for an hour |
E(M) |
|
19 |
31/05/57 |
UK |
came toward, reversed its course |
E(R) |
|
23 |
13/08/59 |
USA |
passed across in front from left to right and
around aircraft |
E(M) |
|
26 |
20/04/64 |
Antarctic |
came from above and paced on the left side |
E(R)+P(P)+R(A) |
|
28 |
03/02/67 |
Peru |
came toward, stopped above, went away, came again
behind |
E(L)+E(M)+E(R) |
|
29 |
09/06/67 |
Spain |
approached and played with aircraft |
E(R) |
|
63 |
18/06/68 |
Venezuela |
approached at same altitude |
E(R) |
|
31 |
22/08/68 |
Australia |
flew ahead of aircraft and maintianed station |
E(R) |
|
32 |
24/10/68 |
USA |
approached from right rear, moved to the left,
paced |
E(R)+R(A) |
|
34 |
02/02/73 |
NZ |
paced parallel |
E(D)+E(M)+E(V) |
|
35 |
16/07/73 |
Spain |
paced and maintained same position on right
|
E(R) |
|
36 |
18/10/73 |
USA |
came toward, stopped above and followed its course
|
E(M)+E(R) |
|
38 |
28/11/74 |
USA |
flew parallel on the left, tipped up and
disappeared |
E(M) |
|
39 |
13/08/76 |
Germany |
paced on the left side slightly behind,
accelerated forward |
E(M)+M(O) |
|
40 |
19/09/76 |
Iran |
stationary, then came toward aircraft, various
maneuvers |
E(I)+E(N)+E(R)+R(A) |
|
41 |
12/03/77 |
USA |
stationary on the left side |
A(H)+E(G)+E(M) |
|
42 |
17/06/77 |
Portugal |
appeared on the right, paced, accelerated and
disappeared |
E(G)+M(O) |
|
43 |
26/10/77 |
USA |
came toward then went on the opposite direction |
E(R) |
|
44 |
18/11/77 |
USA |
paced the aircraft |
E(T) |
|
45 |
26/05/79 |
USA |
came toward , went over to the left, approached
closer |
E(D)+E(M)+E(R)+P(P) |
|
46 |
10/09/79 |
USA |
paced behind and below, moved toward, underneath |
E(R) |
|
48 |
08/04/81 |
USA |
pulled alongside and shot forward |
E(E)+E(R)+E(T) |
|
49 |
18/06/82 |
China |
stationary , climbed rapidly and increased speed.
|
E(G)+E(R) |
|
50 |
24/10/82 |
USA |
paced the aircraft |
E(A) |
|
51 |
23/09/84 |
Argentina |
followed the aircraft |
E(M) |
|
53 |
17/11/86 |
USA |
flew in front and in formation with aircraft |
E(R)) |
In twelve cases, the UAP came toward the aircraft,
remained nearby for from a few seconds to minutes, and
then fell behind or accelerated and disappeared from
view. In a few cases the UAP approached the airplane
close enough that the crew described it as being on a
collision-course. Numerous other similar reports of
this type are found elsewhere (Haines, 2000).
F. Position of UAP relative to the aircraft and E-M
Effects.
N°
|
Date
|
UAP position |
E-M
symptom
|
|
03 |
00/02/44 |
beside |
Radio system and ADF complete failure |
|
08 |
24/07/49 |
beside
/ below |
Engine began to malfunction |
|
11 |
10/02/51 |
behind
/ in front |
Magnetic compass rocking back and forth / ADF
needle jumping |
|
12 |
00/04/51 |
beside
/ above |
Magnetic compass spinning widly / engine began to
run rough |
|
13 |
18/09/51 |
beside |
ADF
went out a few mn / radar jamming and went out |
|
15 |
02/02/55 |
in
front |
Radio
interferences |
|
16 |
24/03/55 |
circled |
All
instruments stopped working and engine sputtered |
|
18 |
16/01/1957 |
beside |
Compass pointed directly toward UAP |
|
19 |
31/05/57 |
in
front |
Radio
total failure |
|
23 |
13/08/59 |
circled |
Magnetic compass rotating continuously (360°
swing) |
|
26 |
20/04/64 |
above
/ beside |
Radio
dead / engine stopped and altitude maintained /
radar stopped working |
|
28 |
03/02/67 |
above
/ behind |
Magnetic compass oscillated 15° left then 20°
right / lights reduced / radio went out |
|
29 |
09/06/67 |
below
/ above |
radio
ceased to function and emitted interferences |
|
63 |
18/06/68 |
|
VHF
interferences |
|
31 |
22/08/68 |
in
front |
communications failed, statics |
|
32 |
24/10/68 |
beside
/ below |
Radio
became unoperative |
|
34 |
02/02/73 |
beside |
ADF
needles rotating aimlessly / magnetic compass
screwed up / VOR lock on UAP |
|
35 |
16/07/73 |
beside |
Radio
failed |
|
36 |
18/10/73 |
above
|
Magnetic compass rotating slowly radio UHF and
VHF frequencies was dead |
|
38 |
28/11/74 |
beside |
Magnetic compass rotated counter-clockwise |
|
39 |
13/08/76 |
beside |
Magnetic compass spinning rapidly in clockwise
direction |
|
40 |
19/09/76 |
in
front |
Inertial navigation system fluctuated / radio
communications lost |
|
41 |
12/03/77 |
beside |
Magnetic compass offset from normal direction /
Autopilot failed to operate normally |
|
42 |
17/06/77 |
beside |
Gyro-compass rotated widly |
|
43 |
26/10/77 |
in
front |
Radio
static |
|
44 |
18/11/77 |
above |
Two
transponders stopped working the first one did not
return to normal |
|
45 |
26/05/79 |
beside |
ADF&
magnetic compass spinning / radio blocked by
static / engine running rough |
|
46 |
10/09/79 |
behind
/ below |
Radio
interferences |
|
48 |
08/04/81 |
beside |
DME
went out / radio failed / transponder went out |
|
49 |
18/06/82 |
in
front/ beside |
Gyro-compass gave awrong direction 30° on right /
radio jamming |
|
50 |
24/10/82 |
behind
/ beside |
Altimeter malfunctioned |
|
51 |
23/09/84 |
behind |
magnetic compass oscillated between 0.5 and 270
degrees. |
|
53 |
17/11/86 |
beside
/ in front |
Radio
inteferences |
UAP’s Relative Position to Aircraft No.
Cases
______________________________________________
- and below
1
Below*
0
Beside
10
- and in front
2
- and above
2
- and behind
1
- and below
2
In front
5
Behind*
1
- and in front
1
- and below
2
Circle
2
______________________________________________
* Perhaps the UAP was impossible to see at this
position.
It is
clear that most of these E-M effects occurred when the
UAP was beside the aircraft (11 cases), beside, or in
another relative position (7).
In several cases, it appears that there is a
correlation between the position of the UAP and E-M
effects on the compasses, more especially their needle
deviation. In several cases the compass pointed
directly toward the UAP as it changed its relative
position. This aspect needs to be studied in greater
depth to help us understand if the magnetic compass
malfunction and/or deviation could have been due to a
strong magnetic field induced by the UAP.
Provisional Conclusions
This preliminary report presents only a brief overview
of pilots’ UAP sighting reports that have E-M effects
on aircraft. Only the 33 highest EMCARM
scoring"category 1" cases are presented here with a
longer report in preparation. An in-depth study of
these selected cases is called for.
From this overview we identified several interesting
points that deserve further study :
1. Private airplane are more likely to be affected by
E-M effects than military or commercial aircraft.
3. Radio systems and compasses are the most affected
systems by UAP.
4. Most of the UAP (in E-M effects cases) are
circular/round in shape.
5. Most of the E-M effects occurred when UAP were
near the aircraft.
6. Magnetic compass deviation seemed to be correlated
to the UAP position. An intense magnetic field appears
to be associated with these UAP.
